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THE CHILD MEDICATION SAFETY ACT: 
SPECIAL TREATMENT FOR THE PARENTS OF 
CHILDREN WITH ADHD? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Casey is a seven year-old with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity 
Disorder (ADHD).1 For the past year, he has taken Ritalin2 to curb his 
hyperactivity at school and help him function in a mainstream classroom.3 
However, the Ritalin has also subjected Casey to negative side effects, and 
his reading scores have become so low that they are off the charts.4 For 
these reasons, Casey’s parents have decided to stop giving him Ritalin.5 In 
an attempt to effectively treat his ADHD, Casey underwent a series of 
tests and examinations at the hospital.6 The hospital’s recommendations 
were taken into consideration when Casey’s school developed an 
Individualized Educational Program (IEP) for him.7 Because the hospital 
recommended drug therapy, the IEP included a provision that Casey 
should be placed on Ritalin, with parental consent.8 Yet because of 
Casey’s past experiences with Ritalin, his parents refused to consent to the 
 1. This story is based on the facts in Valerie J. v. Derry Coop. Sch. Dist., 771 F. Supp. 483 
(D.N.H. 1991). Throughout this Note, the term “ADHD” is used for Attention Deficit Hyperactivity 
Disorder. In this Note, the term also applies to students who have been diagnosed with ADD 
(Attention Deficit Disorder) or other related disorders that can be treated with Ritalin.  
 2. Throughout this Note, “Ritalin” (the brand name for Methylphenidate Hydrochloride) is used 
to refer to a variety of psychotropic drugs that are used to treat disorders such as ADHD. This is 
because Ritalin is one of the most frequently prescribed drugs for ADHD. See infra note 23 and 
accompanying text. 
 3. Valerie J., 771 F. Supp. at 485.  
 4. Id. Casey’s parents have noticed drastic changes in his behavior: he steals and lies, and he is 
aggressive and destructive. Id. at 484–85. 
 5. Id. at 484–85. 
 6. Id. Casey underwent neurological tests in 1985 and again on September 4, 1987. Id. During 
the 1987 tests, conducted at Children’s Hospital in Boston, a report from September 10th stated that 
“Casey J. had characteristics of attention deficit disorder, but no neurological basis for his behavior.” 
Id. In total, the doctors at Children’s Hospital made sixteen recommendations about courses of 
treatment for Casey. Id. These recommendations varied as some recommended cooperative learning, 
structured education, and the use of medications (either Ritalin or Cylert, an experimental drug that 
was known to have side effects that affected the liver). Id. at 485. 
 7. Id. An Individualized Educational Program (IEP) is a procedural element provided under the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1487 (2000); 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1436 (2000). For a more detailed discussion of IEPs, see infra notes 37–56 and accompanying text.  
 8. Valerie J., 771 F. Supp. at 485. In Casey’s case, the IEP included a provision for the use of 
either Ritalin or Cylert if a pediatrician prescribed it, and if the parents agreed to it. Id. 
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IEP.9 Soon after, the school suspended Casey, saying it had “no choice”: 
he was simply too difficult to control.10 
Ms. A is a Kindergarten teacher.11 Each year in her classroom of thirty 
students, as many as seven of them have Attention Deficit Disorder 
(ADD) or ADHD. When she writes on the board, these young students 
squirm in their seats, making it hard for the rest of the students to pay 
attention. Some of these students have been prescribed Ritalin by their 
family doctors or other licensed physicians, and Ms. A recognizes that the 
medications provide a “sense of calm” that is welcomed by both the 
teacher and the student himself. Sam is a child in Ms. A’s class who has 
been having a difficult time concentrating. Ms. A suspects Sam may have 
ADHD, and if so, may benefit from taking Ritalin. She wants to tell Sam’s 
parents about this, but is wary of doing so. Ms. A knows that last year, 
another teacher at her school was accused of coercing a child into taking 
Ritalin when he had the school’s psychologist give informative pamphlets 
to the parents of a child he suspected might also benefit from such therapy. 
Since then, Ms. A’s principal has told all the teachers that they “shouldn’t 
mention anything” about ADHD to parents, because the school doesn’t 
want to be sued or risk losing federal funding.  
As ADHD diagnosis and Ritalin use become omnipresent in our 
society, the tensions described in the above hypotheticals are frequently 
played out in America’s public schools. These tensions raise interesting 
legal questions because, as is often the case when children are involved, 
the suffering child has little or no say in what happens.12 Instead, two well-
intentioned parties—parents and educators—who have different 
perspectives on the effectiveness and appropriateness of using Ritalin to 
treat ADHD, are entitled to make a decision on the child’s behalf.13 In 
worst-case scenarios reported around the country, children have been 
“forced” to take Ritalin as a condition of attending school.14 In response, 
several states have drafted legislation aimed at preventing such 
occurrences.15 The issue has been addressed at the federal level as well: in 
 9. Id. at 486. 
 10. Id.  
 11. The following hypothetical story is compiled from surveys and interviews conducted with 
elementary school teachers in Boulder, Colorado, and a telephone interview with Libby Nealis, 
Director of Public Policy for the National Association of School Psychologists (Feb. 4, 2005) 
[hereinafter Nealis Interview].  
 12. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(B)(vii) (2000). Only in some cases will a child be included in the 
formation of his own IEP. Id. When appropriate, the child should be a member of the IEP team. Id.  
 13. See generally infra Parts II.C.1 and II.C.2.  
 14. See infra note 119.  
 15. See infra note 127. 
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2003, the federal Child Medication Safety Act (CMSA) was introduced in 
Congress,16 which was incorporated into the full scale reauthorization of 
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) in December 
2004.17  
This Note will consider the merits of the CMSA in light of the legal 
rights and competing interests of parents, children, and educators. First, 
this Note will explain the history of students with disabilities’ (which 
includes children with ADHD18) right to a public education, and how the 
framework of IDEA19 provides extensive procedural remedies that are 
designed to give parents meaningful participation in the IEP process. Next, 
this Note will examine the case law that defines the boundaries of parental 
rights and decision-making powers on behalf of their children in both the 
medical and educational contexts, and will discuss the legislation that 
responds to parental concerns about schools forcing Ritalin on their 
children. After analyzing the merits of such legislation, and considering it 
in light of established common law doctrines, this Note proposes that 
legislation such as the CMSA is unnecessary because it has the potential to 
allow parents of children with ADHD to subvert IDEA’s traditional 
avenues of administrative redress available to parents wishing to challenge 
IEPs. The legislation creates opportunities for challenge that are 
unavailable to parents of children with other disabilities. This Note will 
also conclude that the CMSA and other proposed legislation attempt to 
legitimize a sensationalized crisis, and prevent public school personnel 
from focusing on the important parts of their jobs, and acting in the best 
interests of children. 
II. HISTORY 
A. The Increased Use of Ritalin to Treat ADHD in School-Aged Children 
ADHD is a neurological disorder characterized by behavioral patterns 
displaying persistent overactivity and an inability to focus on a single 
task.20 It is particularly common in school-aged children, and is four to 
 16. See infra note 130 and accompanying text.  
 17. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(25) (2004). IDEA is the federal statute governing the education of 
children with disabilities. For a more detailed explanation of IDEA, see infra notes 42–46 and 
accompanying text. IDEA 2004 includes a new provision, which prohibits educators from “requiring a 
child to obtain a prescription for [Ritalin] as a condition of attending school. . . .” 20 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1412(25)(A). 
 18. See infra note 46. 
 19. 20 U.S.C §§ 1400–1487 (2000). 
 20. James C. O’Leary, Note, An Analysis of the Legal Issues Surrounding the Forced Use of 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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five times more likely to occur in boys than girls.21 Because of the 
immediacy of results and relative inexpense, many children diagnosed 
with ADHD are treated with drug therapy.22 For the large majority of 
American children whose ADHD is treated with medication, only two 
controlled substances are widely utilized: methylphenidate (commonly 
known as Ritalin) and amphetamine (primarily Adderall and Dexedrine).23 
In 2000, approximately five million children in the United States took 
Ritalin,24 compared to approximately 900,000 children in 1990.25 This 
represents a 550% increase in the use of Ritalin in a ten-year period.26 
Approximately 90% of the world’s Ritalin is consumed in the United 
States.27  
The cognitive effect of Ritalin on a person with ADHD is a slowing of 
brain functions.28 The noticeable consequence of this effect is that it keeps 
normally hyperactive children relatively still, and reduces their distracting 
behaviors.29 However, Ritalin is also known to dull emotions, or produce 
symptoms of depression or anger.30 For these reasons, many argue that 
there are more appropriate ways to treat ADHD than with drug therapy.31  
Ritalin: Protecting a Child’s Right to “Just Say No,” NEW ENG. L. REV. 1173, 1177 (1993). For a 
more general discussion of the background of Ritalin use and ADHD, see id. at 1177–80.  
 21. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MEDICINE 552 (Charles B. Clayman 
ed., 1989).  
 22. O’Leary, supra note 20, at 1175. 
 23. DEA Congressional Testimony Before the House Comm. on Education and the Workforce: 
Subcomm. on Early Childhood, Youth and Families, 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Terrance 
Woodworth, Deputy Director, Office of Diversion Control), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/ 
pubs/cngrtest/ct051600.htm.  
 24. Eben Carle, ADHD For Sale, PSYCHOL. TODAY, May–June 2000, at 17.  
 25. Id.  
 26. Id.  
 27. Nancy Gibbs, The Age of Ritalin, TIME, Nov. 30, 1998, at 89. Other ADHD and Ritalin-
related issues (including the possibilities of over-diagnosis of ADHD, over-prescription of Ritalin, and 
abuse of Ritalin and sale of it on the street) are beyond the scope of this Note. 
 28. Alan D. Demmitt et al., Children with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder; Ritalin and 
the Law; Recommendations for Practice, 171 EDUC. LAW. REP. 415 (2003). While Ritalin is a 
stimulant that will speed up brain function in a normal brain, it has the opposite effect on an individual 
with ADHD or ADD; the reason for this is unknown in the medical community. PETER SCHRAG & 
DIANE DIVOKY, THE MYTH OF THE HYPERACTIVE CHILD 78 (1975). 
 29. RUSSELL A. BARKLEY, HYPERACTIVE CHILDREN: A HANDBOOK FOR DIAGNOSIS AND 
TREATMENT 7 (1981); BARBARA FISH, STIMULANT DRUG TREATMENT OF HYPERACTIVE CHILDREN, 
THE HYPERACTIVE CHILD 109, 111 (Dennis P. Cantwell ed., 1975).  
 30. BARKLEY, supra note 29, at 197; see also Valerie J. v. Derry Coop. Sch. Dist., 771 F. Supp. 
483, 484–85 (D.N.H. 1991). 
 31. Among the most vocal proponents of this position are parents who have organized 
themselves into activist groups, one of the most popular of which is Able Child: Parents for Label & 
Drug Free Education (www.ablechild.org). See infra note 112 and accompanying text. Other 
proponents of this position are The Center for Cognitive Liberty and Ethics and the National Alliance 
for the Mentally Ill. See Making Choices for Children, www.cognitiveliberty.org/makingchoices/ 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss5/4
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B. Statutory History of Protecting the Right to a Public Education for 
Students with Disabilities  
1. Landmark Cases and the Education of the Handicapped Act  
In 1970, Congress passed the Education of the Handicapped Act 
(EHA)32 as a response to two landmark cases in which handicapped 
children33 and their parents alleged that the children were not being given 
fair access to public education.34 In the first of these cases, Pennsylvania 
Ass’n of Retarded Children v. Commonwealth,35 the district court 
approved a consent decree enjoining Pennsylvania from excluding 
retarded individuals from access to a public education.36 In its decision, the 
court recognized the importance of providing each retarded child with an 
education that would address his or her individual needs and learning 
capacities.37 In the second case, Mills v. Board of Education,38 the district 
court similarly recognized the necessity of preventing children with 
behavioral problems from being categorically excluded from public 
schools.39  
about.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2006); House Passes Child Medication Safety Act, www.namiscc.org/ 
News/2003/Spring/ChildMedicationSafetyAct.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2006). This was also the 
position put forth by the parents of Casey J. in Valerie J., 771 F. Supp. at 485.  
 32. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1485 (1988 & Supp. II 1990) (current version at 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400–
1487 (2004)). The EHA was amended in 1975 to include procedural safeguards, and renamed the 
Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA). LAURA F. ROTHSTEIN, SPECIAL EDUCATION 
LAW 21 (3d ed. 2000). The original 1990 enactment of IDEA is effectively identical to the EAHCA, 
its most significant change being the replacement of the term “handicapped child” with the currently 
preferred “child with a disability.” Id.  
 33. Although the phrase “children with disabilities” is the term currently preferred by the 
disabilities rights movement, the phrase “handicapped children” was used historically and will be used 
in this Note when referring to a past event. I will use the phrase “children with disabilities” when 
discussing current issues.  
 34. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 32, at 12–21.  
 35. 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).  
 36. Id. at 301–02. This class action suit was brought in response to four Pennsylvania statutes 
that, among other things, relieved public schools from the obligation to educate a child who was 
“uneducable” as determined by a public school psychologist, and stated that a school can provide an 
“indefinite postponement of admission” to any child who has not reached a “mental age” of five years. 
Id. at 282 (citing Pennsylvania statutes). The court held argued that the state, having undertaken the 
education of some children, should not be permitted to deny education to retarded children. Id. at 302–
03. 
 37. Id. When the EHA was passed, this concept was molded into the IEP program. See 
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 32, at 39.  
 38. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).  
 39. Id. at 876. The court, ruling on grounds of equal protection and due process, held that the 
Board of Education has an obligation to provide a child with whatever specialized instruction will 
benefit him. Id. at 874. It further noted that financial constraints were not legitimate excuses for 
categorically denying education to handicapped children. Id. at 876.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The need for a uniform approach to the education of the handicapped, 
as evidenced by these cases, was a primary consideration in developing 
and passing the EHA.40 This landmark legislation provided that every 
child, regardless of handicap or disability, is entitled to a “free appropriate 
public education,” or FAPE, as it is commonly known.41 
2. A Floor, Not a Ceiling: IDEA and the IEP 
In 1990, the EHA was renamed the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act (IDEA).42 IDEA was recently amended and reauthorized in 
December of 2004.43 As the “most comprehensive federal statute 
safeguarding the rights of children with disabilities,”44 IDEA, along with 
ensuing case law, has further articulated the concept that children between 
the ages of three and twenty-one deserve a FAPE.45 Children suffering 
 40. STEVEN S. GOLDBERG, SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW: A GUIDE FOR PARENTS, ADVOCATES, 
AND EDUCATORS 19 (1982). The EHA was “an ambitious federal effort to promote the education of 
handicapped children, and was passed in response to Congress’ perception that a majority of 
handicapped children . . . ‘were either totally excluded from school of [were] sitting idly in regular 
classrooms awaiting the time when they were old enough to “drop out.”’” Valerie J., 771 F. Supp. at 
488 (internal citations omitted). 
 41. 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (2000). § 1412(a)(1)(A) reads: “[Each state must provide a] free 
appropriate public education . . . to all children with disabilities residing in the State between the ages 
of 3 and 21, inclusive, including children who have been suspended or expelled from school.” The 
pertinent code section reads:  
The term “free appropriate public education” means special education and related services 
that— 
 (A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction, and 
without charge;  
 (B) meet the standards of the State educational agency;  
 (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school education in the 
State involved; and  
 (D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education program required under 
section 1414(d) of this title. 
Id. § 1401(8). Generally, courts have held that a FAPE is more of a floor than a ceiling. See infra notes 
47–51 and accompanying text.  
 42. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. The 1990 passage of IDEA was essentially a name 
change, replacing the word “handicap” with “disability” in the title and throughout all sections of the 
Act. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 32 at 21. IDEA was amended in 1997. Id.  
 43. Press Release, President Bush Signs Special Education Reform Bill; House Republicans Hail 
Bipartisan Achievement (Dec. 3, 2004) (on file with author), available at 2004 WLNR 17578734; see 
also 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400–1487 (2004).  
 44. Demmitt, supra note 28, at 417.  
 45. 20 U.S.C. § 1412. Many federal courts have further articulated the boundaries of a FAPE. A 
FAPE requires a “demonstrable improvement in the educational and personal skills identified as 
special needs—as a consequence of implementing the proposed IEP.” Town of Burlington v. Dep’t of 
Educ., 736 F.2d 773, 788 (1st Cir. 1984) (“Burlington II”). An IEP-determined placement is sufficient 
if it is “reasonably calculated” to give a child a more-than-trivial educational benefit. Gregory K. v. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss5/4
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from ADHD are recognized as “other health impaired,” which entitles 
them to the protections of IDEA.46 In Hendrick Hudson Board of 
Education v. Rowley,47 the Supreme Court articulated the substantive 
requirement of a FAPE. It emphasized that the IDEA was intended to 
provide students with the opportunity for an education through an 
Individualized Education Program (IEP), which is designed to give the 
student an “educational benefit.”48 The IEP is the hallmark of IDEA, and 
the way in which every disabled student is insured a FAPE.49 According to 
the Rowley Court, a student has received an “educational benefit” even 
Longview Sch. Dist., 811 F.2d 1307–1314 (9th Cir. 1987). A FAPE does not, however, require an IEP 
to meet all of a disabled child’s needs. Lenn v. Portland Sch. Comm., 998 F.2d 1083, 1086 (1st Cir. 
1993) (“[T]he benefit conferred need not reach the highest attainable level. . . .”); Colin K. v. Schmidt, 
536 F. Supp. 1375, 1386 (D.R.I. 1982), aff’d, 715 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1983). Nor does a FAPE mandate a 
particular educational outcome or use of a particular method of education. See, e.g., Hendrick Hudson 
Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 188–89 (1982). These decisions have been made in an effort to 
weigh the goal of providing children with an “appropriate education” with the realistic and practical 
aspects of funding for public schools and the expense of providing specialized services. T.B. v. 
Warwick Sch. Dept., No. CIV.A.01-122T, 2003 WL 22069432, at *4 (D.R.I. June 6, 2003) (citing 
Colin K., 536 F. Supp. at 1386).  
 46. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.7(c)(9) (2005). ADHD is not specifically addressed in IDEA, but is 
considered an “Other Health Impairment”, meaning that the child has  
limited strength, vitality or alertness, including a heightened alertness to environmental 
stimuli, that results in limited alertness with respect to the educational environment, that—(i) 
Is due to chronic or acute health problems such as. . . attention deficit disorder or attention 
deficit hyperactivity disorder; and. . . (ii) [a]dversely affects a child’s educational 
performance. 
Id.  
 47. 458 U.S. at 188–89. In this case, the parents of a deaf girl challenged the school board’s 
determination that their daughter, Amy, who had exceptional lip-reading skills, was not eligible to 
have a full time sign language interpreter to assist her in her regular classes. Id. at 184–85. The 
determination was based on the fact that Amy was “advancing easily from grade to grade,” and 
performing at an above adequate level without the help of an interpreter. Id. at 210. 
 48. Id. at 188–89, 201. An IEP must be “reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive 
educational benefits.” Id. at 207. An “Education benefit” is said to be conferred when the child has 
been given “access to specialized instruction and related services” that is designed for the purpose of 
providing such a benefit. Id. at 200–01.  
 49. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(8)(D) (2000). Essentially, an IEP is a “written statement for each child with 
a disability” that includes: statements about a child’s current “levels of educational performance,” id. 
§ 1414(d)(1)(A)(i), a statement of “measurable annual goals” relating to meeting needs associated with 
the child’s disability, id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(ii), and the special education resources and services 
necessary for these goals to be met, id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(iii). An IEP team is generally comprised of the 
child’s parents, at least one of the child’s “regular education” teachers, at least one “special education” 
teacher, “a representative of the local educational agency,” and someone who can “interpret the 
instructional implications of evaluation results.” Id. § 1414(d)(1)(B). When appropriate, “other 
individuals who have knowledge or special expertise regarding the child” and the child himself can 
and should be members of the team. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(B). For a complete definition of an IEP and the 
procedures involved in implementing one, see generally id. § 1414(d).  
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when the student’s performance is unremarkable.50 This sentiment has 
been echoed in other cases defining the outer limits of a FAPE.51 
Due process is important both substantively and procedurally in IDEA. 
The guarantee of a FAPE insures substantive due process, and the 
extensive procedural regulations satisfy procedural due process by 
allowing parents “meaningful opportunity to participate” in IEP 
formulation.52 IDEA also provides an entire rubric of administrative 
procedural safeguards, the cornerstone of which is an “impartial due 
process hearing.”53 Prior to an administrative hearing, a child’s IEP can be 
implemented only if parents agree to its terms.54 However, if a hearing 
officer determines that a proposed IEP was reasonably calculated to give 
 50. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 198–200; see also Cone v. Randolph County Sch., 302 F. Supp. 2d 500, 
509 (4th Cir. 1990) (“The relatively modest ‘reasonably calculated’ standard of Rowley does not 
require a school district to maximize a handicapped child’s potential. . . .”). In 1991 the Eleventh 
Circuit re-visited the issue of what constitutes an “educational benefit” in JSK v. Hendry County Sch. 
Bd., 941 F.2d 1563 (11th Cir. 1991). In that case, the parents of an autistic child challenged a lower 
court’s determination that the public school’s proposed IEP conferred an educational benefit on their 
son. Id. at 1564–65. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s decision holding that “when 
measuring whether a handicapped child has received educational benefits from an IEP and related 
instructions and services, courts must only determine whether the child has received the basic floor of 
opportunity.” Id. at 1572–73. The majority qualified this statement by noting that this “basic floor of 
opportunity” must include more than de minimus benefits. Id. at 1573; but see Ridgewood Bd. of 
Educ. v. N.E., 172 F.3d 238, 247 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that an educational benefit “must be gauged 
in relation to a child’s potential”).  
 51. T.B. v. Warwick Sch. Dept., No. CIV.A.01-122T, 2003 WL 22069432, at *4 (D.R.I., June 6, 
2003) (“Courts have struggled to flesh out [the] rather cryptic definition [of a FAPE] and to strike a 
proper balance between, on the one hand, the goal of providing . . . an ‘appropriate’ education; and, on 
the other hand, the practical difficulties in determining what is ‘appropriate’ given the considerable 
expense involved.”); see, e.g., Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Garret F., 526 U.S. 66, 78–79 (1999); 
Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. Of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1048 (5th Cir. 1989); Roland M. v. Concord Sch. 
Comm., 910 F.2d 983 (1st Cir. 1990). But see Oberti v. Bd. of Educ. of Borough of Clementon Sch. 
Dist., 789 F. Supp. 1322, 1328 (D.N.J. 1992) (remarking that while states need not provide every 
possible supplementary service or aid for a disabled student, “there will be a floor beneath which such 
provisions will be deemed inadequate. . . . ‘[T]he Act does not permit states to make mere token 
gestures to accommodate handicapped students.’”) (quoting Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d, at 1046). In 
Cypress-Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Michael F., 118 F.3d 245, 253 (1997), the Fifth Circuit went so 
far as to develop a four-pronged test in an attempt to more rigidly define the substantive guarantee of a 
FAPE. The elements of this test demand: (1) that the program be “individualized on the basis of the 
student’s assessment and performance; (2) the program [be] administered in the least restrictive 
environment; (3) the services [be] provided in a coordinated and collaborative manner by the key 
‘stakeholders’; and (4) [that] positive academic and non-academic benefits are demonstrated.” Id. at 
253.  
 52. See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (2000); Warwick Sch., 2003 WL 22069432, at *5.  
 53. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f). These procedural safeguards are the “heart” of IDEA, and the IEP is 
“among the most significant of [the] procedural protections.” RUTH COLKER ET AL., THE LAW OF 
DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION 289 (4th ed. 2003).  
 54. Warwick, 2003 WL 22069432, at *5 (citing 34 C.F.R. § 300.505(a)(1)(ii) (2005)).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss5/4
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the child an educational benefit, it can be implemented over a parent’s 
objections.55  
One of the main goals of IDEA is to create an IEP that allows the child 
to be educated in the least restrictive environment possible.56 This 
preference presumes placement in a mainstream (as opposed to special 
education) classroom that provides maximum contact with non-disabled 
students.57 Unless the opponents of a proposed IEP can prove that the 
drawbacks of placement in a mainstream classroom outweigh the benefits, 
the child will remain in a mainstream classroom.58  
The use of Ritalin to treat ADHD arises when drug therapy is a 
recommended element of an IEP.59 When compared to other successful 
treatment options for ADHD, Ritalin is popular because it is cheap and 
because it provides a relatively simple method to keep students in 
mainstream classrooms.60 Because an IEP can be implemented over a 
parent’s objections,61 a child could be made to take Ritalin if his parents 
choose to keep him in public school.62  
 55. Cf. Hendrick Hudson Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 177 (1982). 
 56. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5):  
To the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities . . . [shall be] educated with 
children who are not disabled, and special classes . . . [shall occur] only when the nature or 
severity of the disability of a child is such that education in regular classes with the use of 
supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily. 
 57. See, e.g., Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1049; Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1204 (3d Cir. 
1993) (determining that the mainstreaming preference is appropriate when a “disabled child can be 
educated satisfactorily in a regular classroom with supplementary aids and services.”) (internal 
citations omitted). See also 34 C.F.R. § 300.50 (2005) (interpreting IDEA’s least restrictive 
environment provision, 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B)). “[H]andicapped children [should not be] removed 
from regular educational environments unless ‘education in regular classes with the use of 
supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.’” Hunt on Behalf of Hunt v. 
Bartman, 873 F. Supp. 229, 246–47 (discussing Department of Education regulation 34 C.F.R. 
§ 300.550 interpreting IDEA least restrictive environment requirements 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B)). For a 
general discussion on the merits of placing children with disabilities in an environment with non-
disabled students, see Kathryn E. Crossley, Note, Inclusion: A New Addition to Remedy a History of 
Inadequate Conditions and Terms, 4 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 239 (2000).  
 58. Hartmann v. Loudoun County Bd. of Educ., 118 F.3d 996, 1001 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing 
DeBries by DeBlaay v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 882 F.2d 876, 879 (1989)). 
 59. Valerie J. v. Derry Coop. Sch. Dist., 771 F. Supp. 483, 485–86 (D.N.H. 1991).  
 60. Cf. id. at 485–86. In Casey J.’s case, his parents wanted to continue his participation in a 
small special education classroom setting. Id. The school board determined that Casey J. could be in 
mainstream classrooms with the assistance of Ritalin. Id.  
 61. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.  
 62. See generally Valerie J., 771 F. Supp. at 483. Obviously, if parents choose to send the child 
to a private school, they can choose one that adheres to the particular educational methodology or 
teaching strategy they prefer.  
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C. Competing Interests: Legal Foundations and Rights 
Legal doctrine tells us that the family is a private realm that the law and 
the state may not unnecessarily invade.63 However, it is imperative to 
consider the well-defined legal boundaries of this private realm.64 There 
are limits on the extent to which parents can make decisions for their 
children both in the contexts of education and medical treatment.65 
Because the ultimate goal must be to protect the best interests of a child, 
the state has the responsibility to intervene when it can be more effective 
than parents in meeting this goal.66  
1. A Tough Pill to Swallow: Limits on the Parental Right to Make 
Medical Decisions for Their Children.  
Whereas competent adults have the legal ability to make decisions 
about their own medical treatment, children are legal incompetents and do 
not have this right.67 Generally, parents are given the decision-making 
power in this context.68 Just as an adult has a recognized right to make an 
unpopular medical decision for herself,69 a parent can make a similarly 
unpopular decision on behalf of her child.70 There are however limits on 
this power, which stem from the notion that parents may not always act in 
their child’s best interest.71 Most typically, this issue arises in the context 
 63. See generally Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1977) (“Our jurisprudence historically has 
reflected Western civilization concepts of the family as a unit with broad parental authority over minor 
children. Our cases have consistently followed that course. . . .”); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
479 (1965); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).  
 64. See generally infra notes 71–86, 91–98 and accompanying text.  
 65. See generally infra notes 71–86, 91–98 and accompanying text. 
 66. See generally infra notes 71–86, 91–98 and accompanying text. 
 67. LESLIE J. HARRIS & LEE E. TIETELBAUM, CHILDREN, PARENTS, AND THE LAW: PUBLIC AND 
PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN THE HOME, SCHOOLS, AND JUVENILE COURTS 231 (2002).  
 68. Parham, 442 U.S. at 602 (“The law’s concept of the family rests on a presumption that 
parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for 
making life’s difficult decisions; natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of 
their children.”).  
 69. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Missouri Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990); Tune v. Walter 
Reed Army Med. Hosp., 602 F. Supp. 1452, 1455 (D.D.C. 1985); In re Estate of Brooks, 205 N.E.2d 
435, 441–42 (Ill. 1965); In re Winthrop Univ. Hosp., 490 N.Y.S.2d 996 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Co. 1985).  
 70. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 589 (1979) (concerning parents who unilaterally sought to 
admit their children to a state mental institution). The Parham Court held that the state could intervene 
in a situation such as this one. Id. at 603. When a parent’s decision is simply unfavorable, however, her 
interest cannot be transferred to the state. Id. A more common case is when parents refuse to provide 
medical treatment to their children. See, e.g., Walker v. Superior Court, 763 P.2d 852 (Cal. 1988); 
State v. McKown, 475 N.W.2d 63 (Minn. 1991).  
 71. Parham, 442 U.S. at 603 (“[A] state is not without constitutional control over parental 
discretion in dealing with children when their physical or mental health is jeopardized.”); In re Phillip 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss5/4
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of parents refusing (as opposed to advocating) medical treatment for their 
minor children.72 Though this is most common in situations where the 
child’s condition is physically life threatening,73 it also holds true in cases 
where the child’s physical health is not in jeopardy.74  
When a parent’s refusal to treat his child amounts to medical neglect, 
the state can intervene under the doctrine of parens patriae.75 This 
determination can be made in the context of a child’s mental or physical 
health.76  
Cases involving mental patients in state institutions are often cited for 
the proposition that parents (as a proxy for their children) should be able to 
B., 156 Cal. Rptr. 48, 51 (Cal. App. 1979) (“The underlying consideration is the child’s welfare and 
whether his best interests will be served by the medical treatment.”). See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 
U.S. 205, 230 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). 
 72. HARRIS & TIETELBAUM, supra note 67, at 244.  
 73. See, e.g., In re Rena, 705 N.E.2d 1155 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999) (allowing court-authorized 
treatment when it is in the child’s best interest, even when parents refuse to consent); In re Cabrera, 
552 A.2d 1114 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (holding that parents can’t refuse treatment for a deadly illness 
for their child, even when treatment is inconsistent with their religious practice).  
 74. See generally Phillip B., 156 Cal. Rptr. 48. In this case, the parents refused to consent to 
heart surgery that would prevent their child, who suffered from a congenital heart disease, from 
suffering lung damage and forcing him to lead a “bed-to-chair” existence. Id. at 50. In Phillip B., the 
court outlined a test to be used when determining whether the state may “insist upon medical treatment 
rejected by the parents.” Id. at 51. These factors include: the likelihood the child will suffer harm 
without treatment and the seriousness of the harm suffered; medical professional’s evaluation and 
opinion of the treatment; any risks involved with the treatment; and if possible, the child’s own wishes. 
Id. Although the Phillip B. court ultimately held that the state could not override the parents’ decision, 
in a later proceeding involving the same family, custody was taken away from Phillip’s parents as a 
result of medical neglect stemming from the heart surgery at issue in this case. Guardianship of Phillip 
B., 188 Cal. Rptr. 781, 790 (Cal. App. 1979); see also In re Sampson, 278 N.E.2d 918 (N.Y. 1972) 
(holding that the state could trump a parents decision not to allow surgery to be performed on a child 
in order to fix his non-life threatening facial deformity). For a discussion regarding parental rights (or 
lack thereof) to refuse medical treatment on behalf of their children in non-life threatening situations, 
see Shireen Arani, Case Comment, State Intervention in Cases of Obesity-Related Medical Neglect, 82 
B.U. L. REV. 875, 885–87 (2002) (explaining that the state can intervene in order to improve a child’s 
quality of life). There is one known instance in which state authorities charged parents with medical 
neglect because they refused to medicate him with Ritalin. Attention Deficit/ Hyperactivity Disorder: 
Are We Overmedicating our Children?: Hearing before the House Comm. on Gov’t. Reform, 107th 
Cong. 24–27 (2002) (statement of Patricia Whethers, President of Able Child); Nealis Interview, supra 
note 11. Although the case was ultimately dropped, it demonstrates the fact that the Ritalin issue may 
be looked at in terms of medical neglect, most likely under the “quality of life” standard.  
 75. In re Phillip B,. 156 Cal. Rep. at 51. Under this doctrine, the state has duty to protect children 
because the state is said to be the “guardian of society’s basic values.” Id. 
 76. The factors in this determination include: the extent to which there is consensus regarding the 
prescribed treatment; the extent to which this treatment can help the child; the possible detrimental 
effects of following the parents’ determination; the child’s ability to function normally with or without 
the treatment; and finally, the danger the child may pose to himself or the community. Elizabeth J. 
Sher, Choosing for Children: Adjudicating Medical Care Disputes Between Parents and the State, 58 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 157, 197 (1983).  
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refuse psychotropic medications.77 In Rogers v. Okin,78 the First Circuit 
held that mental patients have an “intuitively obvious” right to be “left free 
by the state to decide for himself whether to submit to the serious and 
potentially harmful medical treatment that is represented by the 
administration of antipsychotic drugs.”79 Similarly, in Youngberg v. 
Romeo the Supreme Court held that involuntarily committed mental 
patients have a right to be free from physical restraints.80 Both of these 
holdings, however, are subject to important caveats: that individual liberty 
can be outweighed by institutional concerns for safety and “the demands 
for organized society.”81 As long as the decision is made with the exercise 
of professional medical judgment, mental health facilities can assert their 
parens patriae power to restrain a patient.82 
These caveats become crucial when the argument is placed in the 
context of public schools. Because the Ritalin issue involves public 
schools—not mental institutions—cases concerning a school’s right to 
limit individual authority are significant, and worthy of analysis. In Tinker 
v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,83 students and 
their parents challenged a school policy that infringed on their freedom of 
speech.84 In that case, the Supreme Court held that First Amendment rights 
must yield to school order.85 More recently, this rule was upheld in Bethel 
School District No. 403 v. Fraser, in which a student was suspended for 
his speech at a high school assembly that included vulgar language and a 
 77. See, e.g., Amy L. Komoroski, Stimulant Drug Therapy for Hyperactive Children: 
Adjudicating Disputes between Parents and Educators, 11 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 97, 110–12 (2001); 
O’Leary, supra note 20, at 1182–88. The parent’s group Able Child has a link to the O’Leary article 
on its website, showing their endorsement of this proposition. Able Child, Reading for Parents, 
http://www.ablechild.org/documents%20and%20reports.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2006).  
 78. 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980).  
 79. Id. at 653. This “intuitively obvious” right most likely stems from the penumbral right to 
privacy and bodily integrity. O’Leary, supra note 20, at 1183–84.  
 80. 457 U.S. 307 (1982). An involuntarily committed mentally retarded individual brought this 
civil rights suit, by way of his parent, alleging that his substantive due process rights had been 
breached when he was physically restrained for prolonged periods of time. Id. at 309. The Court held 
that individuals, even when involuntarily committed due to mental retardation, have a due process 
right to safe conditions of confinement and freedom from bodily restraints. Id. at 319–20.  
 81. Rogers, 634 F.2d at 654–56; Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 319–20.  
 82. U.S. v. Brandon, 158 F.3d 947, 952 (1998) (citing Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 307). 
 83. 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969). 
 84. In this case, students protested the Vietnam War by wearing black armbands to school. Id. at 
504. The school soon adopted a policy that students wearing these armbands would be suspended if 
they did not remove the bands when asked. Id. In remanding the case for a decision consistent with its 
opinion, the Court noted that First Amendment rights must fall when conduct “materially disrupts 
classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others. . . .” Id. at 513. 
 85. Id. at 507–09. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss5/4
p1567 Berntsen book pages.doc5/18/2006  
 
 
 
 
 
2005] CHILD MEDICATION SAFETY ACT 1579 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor.”86 Though refusing medication is 
not a First Amendment right, these cases delineate how extensively a 
school may be able to limit an individual’s autonomy in order to limit 
disruptions or other conduct that would undermine the “basic educational 
mission” of the school.87 
2. Parental Limits on Controlling Their Child’s Education: Educators 
as Experts 
The right of a parent to direct the upbringing of her children and 
choose a course of education for them was first articulated in Meyer v. 
Nebraska88 and later reinforced in Pierce v. Society of Sisters.89 This 
parental right has since been referred to as “perhaps the oldest of the 
fundamental liberty interests recognized by [the Supreme] Court.”90 But 
this right is not absolute.91 It has been undeniably tempered by state 
regulation of compulsory education.92 Courts have generally taken the 
 86. 478 U.S. 675, 678 (1986). In its opinion, the Court held that the School District was acting 
within its authority in deciding to suspend the student, and that the First Amendment does not “prevent 
the school officials from determining that [a student’s conduct] would undermine the school’s basic 
educational mission.” Id. at 685.  
 87. Id. Furthermore, First Amendment rights are often thought to be those most worthy of 
protection. Ritalin use in schools is not an infringement of First Amendment liberties, but rather a 
possible privacy infringement that is not always subject to the same level of scrutiny.  
 88. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). This case struck down a Nebraska state law that prohibited any 
language other than English from being taught in schools to children younger than eighth grade. Id. at 
403. It was challenged by a teacher who was convicted of teaching German to a ten-year old boy. Id. at 
396. The Court held that the law was a violation of individual liberty interests, which included the 
right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children. Id. at 402–03. This liberty interest, the Court 
noted, cannot be interfered with “under the guise of protecting the public interest.” Id. at 399–400.  
 89. 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925). In this case, the Court struck down the Compulsory Education 
Act of 1922, which required that every child attend a public school. Id. at 530. In doing so, it 
determined that the Act was a violation of a parent’s Fourteenth Amendment liberty right to direct the 
upbringing and education of their children, a right that was previously articulated in Meyer, 262 U.S. 
at 390. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534–35.  
 90. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).  
 91. See infra notes 92–102 and accompanying text.  
 92. This power is derived from the states’ Tenth Amendment police power, which the state can 
use to insure the “health, safety, welfare, and morals” of its citizens. U.S. Const. amend. X. See 
generally Bangor Baptist Church v. Maine, 549 F. Supp. 1208, 1220–22 (D. Me, 1982) (holding that, 
while Maine’s compulsory education laws did impose a burden on the plaintiff’s fundamentalist 
Christian religious practices, they were not unduly burdensome, and did not violate the establishment 
clause). See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972) (“There is no doubt as to the power of 
a State, having a high responsibility for education of its citizens, to impose reasonable regulations for 
the control and duration of basic education.” (citing Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534 (1925)); Meyer, 262 U.S. 
at 402 (1923) (“The power of the state to compel attendance at some school and to make reasonable 
regulations for all schools. . . is not questioned.”). 
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position that it is the state’s responsibility to monitor the content of 
curriculum as well as the teaching method used to educate children.93  
In essence, Pierce and Meyer stand for the proposition that parents may 
choose to educate their children in any number of ways, be it through 
parochial school, secular private school, public school, home school, or 
any educational institution that complies with compulsory education 
laws.94 Yet, if a parent chooses to educate his child in the public school 
system, his parental liberty interests do not extend so far as to allow him to 
influence the school’s curriculum or teaching method.95 As it relates to 
IDEA and a parent’s input in an IEP, this doctrine of limited parental input 
means that parents cannot demand that a particular teaching method be 
used.96 As long as the method implemented by the school is “reasonably 
calculated” to provide an “appropriate” education, a child’s substantive 
rights have been protected and parents cannot demand an alternative.97 
Several cases have solidified this rule in conjunction with IEPs.98 In 
T.B. v. Warwick School Department, the court held that the school’s 
proposed IEP, advocating one method of educating autistic children, was 
acceptable even though the parents advocated another educational 
method.99 In Cone v. Randolph County Schools,100 the court similarly held 
 93. Philip T.K. Daniel, Education for Students with Special Needs: The Judicially Defined Role 
of Parents in the Process, 29 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 4 (2000) (“The federal judiciary has determined that the 
state has a compelling interest in ensuring that children are adequately educated and that, in education 
generally, the rights of parents challenging such an interest are relatively de minimus.”). 
 94. See generally Pierce, 268 U.S. 510. 
 95. Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 533–34 (1995). The particular facts 
of this case demonstrate the remarkable amount of leeway and discretion schools have in designing 
their curriculum, and the methods they use to teach that curriculum. Id. at 529–30. In the instant case, 
students and their parents took issue with a mandatory “AIDS awareness” program that was sexually 
explicit in nature, had minor students participate by licking condoms and putting them over the heads 
of other students, made multiple references to orgasms and genitals, and used profane and lewd 
language do describe body parts and excretory functions. Id. at 529. The First Circuit held that a state 
can not prevent parents from choosing a specific educational program for their child (such as parochial 
or other private schooling), but when the parents have chosen to have their child educated within the 
public schools, they do not have a fundamental liberty interest to dictate the curriculum. Id. at 533.  
 96. See infra notes 97–102 and accompanying text.  
 97. See generally Hedrick Hudson Bd. of Ed. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982). Administrative 
review insures substantial procedural due process as well. Id. § 1415.  
 98. See, e.g., Burilovich v. Bd. of Educ. of the Lincoln Consolidated Sch., 208 F.3d 560, 566 (6th 
Cir. 2000); Cone v. Randolph County Sch., 302 F. Supp. 2d 500 (M.D.N.C. 2004); T.B. v. Warwick 
Sch. Dep’t., No. CIV. A. 01-122T, 2003 WL 22069432 (D.R.I. June 6, 2003). 
 99. 2003 WL 22069432, at *18. In this case the parents advocated a program called Discrete 
Trial Training (DTT) for their autistic son. Id. at *1. This program was only available at a private 
school, and the parents wanted the state to pay for the services its schools were not offering. Id. at *2. 
The state successfully argued that its school that offered the Treatment and Education of Autistic and 
Related Communication Handicapped Children (TEACCH program), would provide the child with an 
appropriate education because there were similarities between the methods. Id. at *18–20. 
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that both substantive and procedural due process requirements had been 
satisfied in an IEP. The IEP proposed that a child be transferred from an 
out-of-state private school (for which the State of North Carolina was 
paying) to an in-state school that used a different teaching method.101 
Although the parents disagreed with the recommendation and challenged it 
in an administrative hearing, the court ultimately held that the new IEP 
was “reasonably calculated” to meet the child’s needs, and that the court 
should be “reluctant indeed to second-guess the judgment of education 
professionals.”102  
The legal doctrine on which these cases stand was first developed in 
Burilovich v. Board of Education of the Lincoln Consolidated Schools,103 
in which the court approved of the weight given to opinions of educational 
agencies in administrative IEP hearings. It noted that in determinations in 
which an educator’s expertise is relevant (such as deciding on an 
appropriate method of educating a disabled student), the educator’s 
decisions carry more weight than the parents’.104 Accordingly, when 
parents and educators disagree about the contents of an IEP, the 
recommendations of educators, as experts in the areas of education policy 
and practice, are regularly given deference.105  
One of the earliest reported cases in which parents challenged a 
school’s right to medicate a child without parental consent was Valerie J. 
 100. 302 F. Supp. 2d at 509, 512.  
 101. Id. at 504–05. In this case, a North Carolina child diagnosed with Fragile X Syndrome was 
being treated at the Benedictine School for Exceptional Children in Maryland pursuant to his North 
Carolina 2000 IEP because it was determined that there was no appropriate placement in North 
Carolina. Id. at 504. In 2001, an appropriate facility in North Carolina was identified, and the school 
district encouraged the child to be transferred there. Id. at 504–05. His parents contested this change in 
the IEP on the basis that the two facilities used different teaching methods. Id. The court upheld the 
2001 IEP, dictating that Elliott would attend the North Carolina facility on the basis that the 
determination was “reasonably calculated” to allow Elliott to receive educational benefits. Id. at 512. 
 102. Id. at 509 (citing Tice v. Botetourt County Sch. Bd., 908 F.2d 1200, 1207 (4th Cir. 1990)).  
 103. 208 F.3d at 566. This case also involves an autistic child, and a disagreement between the 
child’s parents and educators over the teaching method that should be used help treat and educate him. 
Id. at 563. The parents argued that the DTT method should be used because the child performed best 
when being taught according to that program. Id. The school, however, felt that the programs it used 
were sufficient to bestow upon the child the educational benefit to which he was entitled. Id. at 564. At 
an administrative hearing conducted by a state hearing officer, the officer agreed that the school had 
developed an IEP that was reasonably calculated to give the child an educational benefit. Id. at 564. In 
affirming the lower court’s ruling in favor of the school district, the Sixth Circuit stated that that courts 
should not “substitute their own notions of sound educational policy for those of the school authorities 
which they review.” Id. at 572. Because the hearing officer was an educational expert, and the officer’s 
findings were reasonable based on the evidence, the court should not overturn them. Id.  
 104. Id. at 572.  
 105. Id.  
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v. Derry Cooperative School District.106 In that case, the IEP 
recommended medication, the parents disapproved, and the school 
subsequently suspended the child.107 The court held that this was a 
violation of the parents’ procedural due process rights afforded under 
IDEA.108 Although over ten years have passed since Valerie J., only a few 
courts have since considered child medication without parental consent. 
However, the child medication issue is frequently addressed in 
administrative hearings before the Department of Education.109 
3. Popular Response and Action—Pushing the Limits of Parental 
Rights 
In the past seven years,110 the issue of forced medication of hyperactive 
children as a precondition of public school attendance has made its way 
from the largely unpublicized world of administrative hearings to the 
forefront of a thriving and sensationalized social debate.111 Across the 
country, parents, frustrated with two seemingly hopeless options of 
medicating their child or having him expelled from school, have found a 
voice through a grassroots support community.112 Able Child: Parents for 
 106. 771 F. Supp 483, 484 (D.N.H. 1991). In this case, the District Court overturned the 
administrative hearing officer’s determination that the school could medicate the child without his 
parent’s consent. Id. at 489.  
 107. Id. at 484–87. 
 108. Id. at 490. It is important to note that this case was primarily decided on procedural violations 
of IDEA, and not on the issue of recommending Ritalin. Id. The court maintained that the physician’s 
recommendations that Ritalin be included in the IEP were reasonable, but that it was unreasonable for 
the school to “[insist] that the parents consent to medication as a necessary component of the IEP.” Id. 
at 489. Valerie J. remains, however, one of the only cases on record in which parents have challenged 
the content of an IEP in the context of Ritalin use and ADHD. Interview with Libby Nealis, supra note 
11. Recently, Patricia Weathers, founder of Able Child, is one of the few to have actually filed suite. 
See also testimony of Patricia Weathers, infra note 121, at 26 (testifying that she filed a lawsuit in 
federal court against her son’s school district regarding the school’s coercing her into drugging her 
son). 
 109. Nealis Interview, supra note 11. There have really only been one or two known cases in 
which parents have been coerced into medicating their children. Id. In those extreme cases, the schools 
were “way out of bounds” and any procedural problems were resolved at much lower levels. Id.  
 110. The first legislative resolution relating to this issue was passed in 1999 by the Colorado State 
Board of Education. Bills and Resolutions, http://www.fightforkids.com/bills_resolutions.htm (last 
visited Feb. 6, 2005) [hereinafter Table of State Legislation] (“In 1999, the Colorado State Board of 
Education passed a precedent-setting Resolution [asking] school personnel to use academic rather than 
drug solutions to resolve problems with behavior, attention and learning.”). For a copy of the 
Resolution, see Colorado School Board Passes Resolution About Ritalin, EDUCATION REPORTER, No. 
167, Dec. 1999, available at http://www.eagleforum.org/educate/1999/dec99/ritalin.html. 
 111. See infra notes 112–28 and accompanying text. 
 112. See generally Parents for Label and Drug Free Education, http://www.ablechild.org (last 
visited Mar. 3, 2005). This site, one of the most prominent, was started by two mothers as a reaction to 
their families’ experiences. The History of Able Child, http://www.ablechild.org/history.htm (last 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss5/4
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Label and Drug Free Education is one of the most prominent of these 
organizations.113 Although it does not claim any religious affiliation and its 
members are not by-and-large members of the Church of Scientology, 
Able Child receives a significant portion of its funding from that 
Church.114 As part of its doctrine, the Church of Scientology holds a 
disbelief in psychiatry and in treating mental disorders with 
pharmaceuticals.115 Able Child has developed a website to give parents a 
venue for sharing their personal stories,116 informing them about legal 
issues and legislation,117 urging letter-writing campaigns and petitions,118 
and even providing a list where parents can add their name and hometown 
and state who pressured or coerced them into drugging their children.119 
The members of Able Child and other such organizations have announced 
their message loudly and clearly, and have gained national attention.120 In 
visited Mar. 3, 2005).  
One of AbleChilds [sic] goals is to educate the educators [because] they have been exposed to 
only one-side of this issue, many being taught that . . . medicating children is a solid answer 
for behavioral or attentional [sic] problems. [They think] these medications are mild 
substances, completely unaware of the very real risks and dangers that these drugs can have 
on a child. This is part of the problem. As an organization we are there to open their eyes to 
the reality of the situation. - Ms. Patricia Weathers 
About Us, http://www.ablechild.org/about%20us.htm (last visited on Mar. 3, 2005). For a list of other 
organizations sharing the goals of Able Child, see Recommended links, http://www.ablechild.org/ 
links/htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2005).  
 113. According to the member list on their website, ablechild.org has almost 300 registered 
members from almost all states and several foreign countries. The Able Child Member List, 
http://www.ablechild.org/memberlist.asp (last visited Mar. 3, 2005).  
 114. Nealis Interview, supra note 11.  
 115. Id. The Church of Scientology’s most recent foray in the spotlight came from one of its most 
prominent members, actor Tom Cruise, who infamously declared on the Today Show that fellow actor 
Brooke Shields was “misinform[ed]” about taking medication to treat postpartum depression, and that 
“[t]here is no such thing as a chemical imbalance in a body.” Richard Leiby, A Couch Tom Cruise 
Won’t Jump On: Actor Lambastes Psychiatry on ‘Today’, WASH. POST, June 25, 2005, at C-01. Cruise 
also advocated his religion’s position that drugs like Ritalin and Adderall are “street drugs” that should 
not be used to treat children with ADD and ADHD. Id.  
 116. Parents Speak Out Against Schools Coercing Them to Place Children on Psychiatric Drugs, 
http://ablechild.org/voices.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2006).  
 117. Child Labeling & Drugging Bills & Resolutions Passed, http://www.ablechild.org/ 
slegislation. htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2006); Federal Legislation, http://www.ablechild.org/flegislation. 
htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2006).  
 118. Petition for Children’s Rights Against Stigma and Psychiatric Drug Abuse, 
http://petitiononline.com/forkids/petition.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2006). 
 119. The Following Parents Attest to the Fact that They Have Been Pressured and/or Coerced by 
School Personnel to Place Their Children on Psychotropic Drugs, http://www.ablechild.org/data/ 
thelist.asp (last visited Mar. 3, 2005).  
 120. According to their website, members of Able Child: Parents for Label and Drug Free 
Education have appeared on the Today Show, CNN, the CBS Evening News, Good Morning America 
and other national television programs. About Us, http://www.ablechild.org/about%20us.htm (last 
visited Mar. 3, 2005).  
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2002, the founder of Able Child testified before the House Committee on 
Government Reform regarding her family’s experiences when school 
officials coerced her into medicating her son with Ritalin.121  
D. State Legislation 
In 1999, the Colorado State Board of Education passed a resolution 
that, for the first time, addressed the increased use of Ritalin in schools 
and called for alternative methods of treating ADD and ADHD.122 This 
original resolution focused in large part on the detrimental side-effects of 
Ritalin and its tendency to increase suicidal or violent behavior.123 The 
resolution was in part a reaction to the then-recent events at Columbine 
High School, where Eric Harris and his friend Dylan Klebold led a 
shooting spree, killing twelve of their classmates before taking their own 
 121. Ms. Patricia Whethers, President and Co-Founder of Able Child, testified on September 26, 
2002 that: 
[T]he school principal. . . said that unless I agreed to put [my son] on medication, she would 
find a way to transfer him to a Special Education Center. I felt intimidated, scared, and unsure 
of what to do as a result of the school’s coercive tactics. At no time was I offered any 
alternatives. . . . The schools [sic.] one and only solution was to have my child drugged. . . . 
The drug cocktail [prescribed by the school psychologist] made his behavior more and more 
out of character [, and f]earing what the drugs had done to him, I stopped them. [T]he school 
threw [my son] out [and f]or a final blow, they proceeded to call child protective services on 
my husband and I [sic.], charging us with medical neglect. . . . As a mother, I should have 
been given all this information [about controversies surrounding AHDH diagnosis and 
treatment]. . . . I would never have subjected my son to being labeled with a mental 
disorder. . . I would not have allowed my son to be administered drugs. . . . Its for this reason 
that I am asking this committee to. . . enact legal safeguards. . . .  
Attention Deficit/ Hyperactivity Disorder: Are We Overmedicating our Children?: Hearing before the 
House Comm. on Government Reform, 107th Cong. 24, 26–27 (2002) (prepared statement of Patricia 
Whethers, President of Able Child). 
 122. Resolution Against Psychotropic Medications, supra note 110 (“Be it resolved that. . . Mind-
altering psychotropic drugs . . . shall not be dispensed to children for [ADHD]. . . . Tutoring, vision 
testing, phonics. . . and other remedies known to be effective and harmless shall be recommended to 
parents as their options.”). Id.  
 123. Id. (“Whereas. . . [s]ome patients have been reported to have an increase in suicidal thoughts 
and/or violent behavior. . .”). See also John J. Lumpkin, Associated Press, Suicide Warning Will 
Accompany ADHD Medicine: The Maker of Straterra, Used to Treat Attention Deficit Hyperactivity 
Disorder, Said the Drug’s Label Will Carry a Warning About Suicidal Thoughts in Children Who Take 
It, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 30, 2005, at A.  
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lives.124 It was later discovered that Harris had been taking anti-
depressants that had side effects similar to those of Ritalin.125 
More recently, Colorado passed a law requiring each school board “to 
adopt a policy to prohibit school personnel from recommending or 
requiring the use of a psychotropic drug for any student.”126 In total, three 
states have passed similar legislation that is consistent with the agenda set 
forth by parent organizations such as Able Child.127 Most other states are 
in various stages of passing such legislation.128  
E. Federal Legislation: Preserving Communication Between Parents and 
Educators 
As a response to the legislation enacted or pending in several states and 
the testimony given during the House Committee on Government 
Reform,129 federal legislation commonly known as the Child Medication 
Safety Act (CMSA) was introduced to Congress in 2003.130 This bill 
 124. Resolution Against Psychotropic medications, supra note 110 (“Whereas . . . Eric Harris 
began [taking Luvox and] began planning the massacre one year prior to the April 20, 1999 Columbine 
shooting—indicating that his destructive mania emerged shortly after he began taking Luvox, and [his] 
an autopsy found a “therapeutic level” of Luvox in [his] bloodstream.”). See also Lynn Bartels & 
Carla Crowder, Fatal Friendship: How Two Suburban Boys Traded Baseball and Bowling for Murder 
and Madness, DENV. ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Aug. 22, 1999, at Special Pullout Section.  
 125. Id. 
 126. H.B. 1172, 64th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2003).  
 127. Currently there are three states that have laws directly prohibiting school personnel from 
recommending psychotropic drugs for children: Colorado, Virginia, and Connecticut. COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 22-32-109(1)(ee) (2005) (“Each board of education shall . . . adopt a policy to prohibit school 
personnel from recommending or requiring the use of a psychotropic drug for any student. School 
personnel shall not test or require a test for a child’s behavior without prior written permission from 
the parents. . . .”); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-274.3 (2003) (requiring the Board of Education to “develop 
and implement policies prohibiting school personnel from recommending the use of psychotropic 
medications for any student”) (“An act concerning recommendations for and refusals of the use of 
psychotropic drugs by children . . . prohibiting any school personnel from recommending the use of 
psychotropic drugs for any child. The refusal of a parent or other person having control of a child to 
administer or consent to the administration of any psychotropic drug to such child shall not, in and of 
itself, constitute grounds for the Department of Children and Families to take such child into 
custody.”). 2001 Conn. Acts 01-124 (Reg. Sess.). A list of U.S. legislative bills and resolutions that 
have been introduced or passed against coercive psychiatric labeling and drugging of children, see 
Table of State Legislation, supra note 110.  
 128. Id.  
 129. 149 CONG. REC. H1753 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 2003) (statement of Rep. Burns) (“Last year [in] 
the House Committee on Government Reform. . . [we heard shocking testimony] that some school 
officials have taken it upon themselves to decide that a child needs to be placed on psychotropic 
drugs. . . . [the legislation I have introduced] will address a significant problem facing children and 
their parents.”).  
 130. H.R. 1170, 108th Cong. (2003). It was introduced on March 11, 2003, by Representative 
Max Burns (R-GA). Id. The original language of the bill stated its purpose as “protect[ing] children 
and their parents from being coerced into administering psychotropic medication in order to attend 
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required states,131 as a condition of receiving federal funding,132 to develop 
policies that would prohibit schools and school personnel from requiring a 
child133 to obtain a prescription for Ritalin134 as a condition of attending 
school or receiving services.135 
The CMSA was referred to the Committee on Education and the 
Workforce, which specifically addressed the concern that the harsh 
punishment for violating the law136 would scare teachers away from 
discussing drug therapy with parents as one possible option for treating 
ADHD.137 After being amended to reflect these concerns, the bill was re-
introduced.138 Floor debates showed overwhelming support of the 
legislation,139 and it was eventually passed in the house 425 votes to 
school, and for other purposes. . . .” Id.  
 131. Id. at section 3 (“(2) STATE.—The term ‘State’ means each of the 50 states, the District of 
Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.”). 
 132. Id. at section 2 (“As a condition of receiving funds under any program or activity 
administered by the Secretary of Education.”).  
 133. Id. at section 3 (“(1) CHILD.—The term ‘child’ means any person within the age limits for 
which the State provides free public education.”). 
 134. Id. at section 2. The bill encompasses any controlled substances in schedule II under section 
202(c) of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 812(c)). Id.  
 135. Id. at section 2.  
 136. See Libby Nealis, The Child Medication Safety Act, NASP COMMUNIQUÉ, VOL. 33, NO. #1, 
Sept. 2004, adapted version available at www.nasponline.org/advocacy/SPAN/span_sept04_ 
childmed.html.  
 137. Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce: Markup of H.R. 1170, The Child Medication Safety Act 
of 2003, 108th Cong. 1–2 (2003) (statement by Rep. Max Burns) (“We’ve also made an important 
clarification to ensure that parents and teachers are able to have an open dialogue about any academic 
or behavior related needs of the child. This legislation is intended only to prevent school personnel 
from requiring children to be medicated.”).  
 138. Child Medication Safety Act of 2003, H.R. 1170, 108th Cong. (2003). The amended 
construction reads as follows:  
Sec. 2. Required Policies and Procedures: (a) In General.—As a condition of receiving funds 
under any program or activity administered by the Secretary of Education, not later than 1 
year after the date of the enactment of this Act, each State shall develop and implement 
policies and procedures prohibiting school personnel from requiring a child to obtain a 
prescription for substances covered by section 202(c) of the Controlled Substances Act (21 
U.S.C. 812(c)) as a condition of attending school or receiving services [for a description of 
“services” see 20 USC 1412(a)(3)]. (b) Rule of Construction.—Nothing in subsection (a) shall 
be construed to create a Federal prohibition against teachers and other school personnel 
consulting or sharing classroom-based observations with parents or guardians regarding a 
student’s academic performance or behavior in the classroom or school, or regarding the 
need for evaluation for special education or related services under 612(a)(3) of the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (20 U.S.C. 1412(a)(3)).  
Id. (emphasis added); 149 CONG. REC. H4382, H4383 (daily ed. May 21, 2003) (statement of Rep. 
Woosley) (“[N]o one wants a school to force parents to medicate their children. . . [b]ut neither do we 
want teachers. . . to be afraid to talk to parents about children’s behavior or to suggest that a child 
should be evaluated by a medical health practitioner.”).  
 139. 149 CONG. REC. at H4383 (statement of Rep. Burns) (“This bill is not antischool [sic], 
antiteacher [sic], or antimedication [sic]. This bill is pro-children and pro-parent.”). Id. (statement of 
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one.140 The sole member of the House to vote against the bill was 
Congresswoman Susan Davis of California, a former school board 
member.141 While she appreciated the changes in favor of open 
communication, she continued to voice concern about the impact of the 
legislation on well-intentioned teachers. She opined that the legislation 
was frivolous, and a “solution without a problem” in that no empirical 
evidence regarding the frequency with which this problem occurs had been 
presented.142 Most significantly, she explained, IDEA’s IEP procedure 
already provides due process safeguards for parents who disagree with 
school recommendations, making the CMSA a quick way for some parents 
to circumvent this established procedure.143 
Once passed to the Senate for review, the bill was referred to the 
Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions.144 Senator 
Edward Kennedy, a member of this committee, was a vocal opponent of 
this legislation and “single-handedly” kept it from being approved in the 
Rep. Wilson) (“Only medical personnel [not educators] have the ability to determine if a prescription 
for a controlled substance is appropriate for a child.”). Id. at H4383-84 (statement of Rep. Kennedy) 
(expressing support of the bill with the added language when stating, “[T]eachers have a window into 
what is going on in that child’s life, and they are best equipped to be able to talk to those parents and 
be able to consult with those parents about what those children might need,” and citing stigma of 
mental illness as reason to support the bill). Id. at H4384 (statement of Rep. Murphy) (speaking as a 
medical professional on the necessity of this bill in preventing schools from coercing medical 
personnel and parents). Id. at H4385 (statement of Rep. Norwood) (citing the common-sensical 
approach to support of H.R. 1170). Id. (statement of Rep. Davis (IL) (addressing possible abuse of 
Ritalin and overuse of drug therapy as reasons to support the bill). Id. at H4386 (statement of Rep. 
Hastert) (explaining an extreme outcome of charging parents with medical neglect for resisting school 
coercion).  
 140. 149 CONG. REC. at H4398. The vote was taken by electronic device: there were 425 yays, 
one nay, and eight who abstained from voting. Id.  
 141. 149 CONG. REC. at H4385 (statement of Rep. Davis). 
Are there bad apples in the world of education who may have put inappropriate pressure on a 
parent to seek a pharmaceutical solution to a behavior problem? Well, yes, there possibly 
are. . . I think we discredit the tens of thousands of wonderful teachers in our country when 
we legislate based on th[e] false assumption [that all teachers do this].  
Id.  
 142. Id. (“I believe that legislation should be based on the documented existence of a problem, not 
on hearsay and innuendo; and I believe that all of the wonderful, caring teachers in our country should 
be celebrated. . . not tarnished by the stated assumption of this measure.”). 
 143. Id. (“[T]he parent has clear due process rights to seek an evaluation through the special 
education process. . . . If the parent is dissatisfied with those results, an appeal to a due process hearing 
officer is available.”). 
 144. S. 1390, 108th Cong. (2003). The Bill’s original sponsors was Senators Ensign (R-NV) and 
Senator Alexander (R-TN) was the original cosponsor. Later sponsors included Allard (R-CO) on July 
24, 2003, Hagel (R-NE) on July 31, 2003 and Graham (R-SC) on Sept. 4, 2003. Thomas S.1390, 
available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/Z?d108:SN01390:@@@Pe (last visited Feb. 22, 
2006).  
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Senate.145 Although there is relatively little opposition from other 
members of the Senate, Senator Kennedy’s position is strongly supported 
by professional mental health organizations including the American 
Psychiatric Association146 and the National Association of School 
Psychologists (NASP).147  
In November 2004 Congress recommended a large-scale 
reauthorization of IDEA, including several modifications to the 1997 
version.148 In December of 2004, President George W. Bush signed the 
new IDEA into law.149 Included in this reauthorization were several 
provisions designed to give parents a larger role in decisions affecting the 
education of their disabled children.150 One such provision is modeled on 
the CMSA.151 Because of this inclusion in IDEA, the CMSA as an 
independent bill is no longer before Congress.152 The most significant 
difference between the last proposed independent CMSA and the version 
 145. Jessica E. Vascellaro, Kennedy ties up drug bill, BOSTON GLOBE, July 2, 2004, (reporting 
that Sen. Kennedy opposes the bill, and contended that the issue required more study), available at 
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2004/07/02/kennedy_ties_up_drug_bill/; see also Edward 
M. Kennedy, Editorial, The Child Medication Safety Act, BOSTON GLOBE, July 7, 2004 (responding to 
the previous article by stating that his opposition stems from the fact that the bill does too little, and 
may have the “unintended effect of discouraging schools from identifying and informing parents about 
the classroom difficulties faced by children with mental health or learning issues”).  
 146. APA Online, Public Policy Office, Letter on Child Medication Safety Act of 2003 (May 14, 
2003), http://www.apa.org/ppo/issues/cmsa1170.html (“In our view, enactment of this legislation is 
likely to cause harm . . . given the bill’s strict enforcement mechanism,. . . school personnel could be 
expected to be fearful of the risks of speaking openly with families about a student’s emotional well-
being and/or behavior, or recommending a mental health evaluation.”).  
 147. Nealis, supra note 136 (voicing concern that HR 1170 would create a “gag rule” on school 
personnel which is particularly dangerous to children who have mental health problems legitimately 
requiring treatment because “[c]hildren spend the majority of their awake hours in school; school 
personnel therefore are often the first to observe behaviors . . . that suggest the presence of [such 
problems]”).  
 148. Government Press Release, supra note 43.  
 149. Id.  
 150. Id.  
 151. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(25) (2004).  
PROHIBITION ON MANDATORY MEDICATION- 
(A) IN GENERAL- The State educational agency shall prohibit State and local educational 
agency personnel from requiring a child to obtain a prescription for a substance covered by 
the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.) as a condition of attending school, 
receiving an evaluation under subsection (a) or (c) of [section 614], or receiving services 
under this chapter. 
(B) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION- Nothing in subparagraph (A) shall be construed to create a 
Federal prohibition against teachers and other school personnel consulting or sharing 
classroom-based observations with parents or guardians regarding a student’s academic and 
functional performance, or behavior in the classroom or school, or regarding the need for 
evaluation for special education or related services under paragraph (3).  
Id.  
 152. Nealis Interview, supra note 11. 
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incorporated into IDEA 2004 is that the new IDEA provision does not 
make federal funding contingent on states adopting policies consistent 
with the idea of the legislation.153 
 153. Id.; see also S. 1390, 108th Cong. (2003) (“As a condition of receiving funds . . . each state 
shall develop and implement policies and procedures prohibiting school personnel from requiring a 
child to obtain a prescription [for Ritalin].”). Although this is a positive change, and NASP is satisfied 
that the wording incorporated in IDEA 2004 essentially codifies the already understood policy that 
school officials must not coerce children into taking Ritalin, they warn that the schism between parents 
and school officials in detecting and treating mental health issues in children are far from over. Nealis 
Interview, supra note 11. More recently, a movement has started that is working to “ban mental health 
screenings in schools” with the same players (namely Able Child) arguing that this process will soon 
become mandatory and will result in even more children being forced to take Ritalin. Id. On January 4, 
2005 the “Parental Consent Act of 2005” was introduced in the House as a preemptive strike against 
mandatory screening. H.R. 181, 109th Cong. § 2 (2005). The bill was prompted by the following 
“Findings:” 
 Section 2—(9) There has been a precipitous increase in the prescription rates of psychiatric drugs 
in children: 
(A) A 300-percent increase in psychotropic drug use in 2 to 4 year old children from 1991 to 
1995. . .  
(B) A 300-percent increase in psychotropic drug use in children from 1987 to 1996. . .  
(C) More money was spent on psychiatric drugs for children than on antibiotics or asthma 
medication in 2003. . .  
 Section 2—(13) Parents are already being coerced to put their children on psychiatric 
medications and some children are dying because of it. . . Across the country [people like 
Patricia Weathers have been] threatened with child abuse charges for refusing or taking their 
children off of psychiatric medications. 
 Section 2—(14) The United States Supreme Court in Pierce versus Society of Sisters 
(268 U.S. 510 (1925)) held that parents have a right to direct the education and upbringing of 
their children. 
 Section 2—(15) Universal or mandatory mental health screening violates the right of 
parents to direct and control the upbringing of their children. 
Id.  
 Based on these findings, the following has been proposed:  
Section 3—(a) UNIVERSAL OR MANDATORY MENTAL HEALTH SCREENING PROGRAM—No 
Federal funds may be used to establish or implement any universal or mandatory mental 
health screening program. 
(c) DEFINITION—For purposes of this Act, the term “universal or mandatory mental health 
screening program”[includes] . . .  
(B) any student mental health screening program that allows mental health screening of 
individuals under 18 years of age without the express, written, voluntary, informed consent of 
the parent or legal guardian of the individual involved.  
Id. The most recent action involving the Parental Consent Act was referral to the House Subcommittee 
on Education Reform on Feb. 9, 2005. Bill Summary and Status, ¶ 23, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquerytr/Z?d109:HR00181:@@@X (last visited Feb. 6, 2006).  
 While the notion of mental health screenings in schools is beyond the scope of this Note, it is 
significant in demonstrating the power of the “Parent’s Rights” movement and the continuation of 
legislation that stigmatizes mental illness, and the role schools play in diagnosing it. Furthermore, 
existing law requires parental consent before a child undergoes mental health screening. Nealis 
Interview, supra note 11. 
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III. ANALYSIS 
As evidenced above, there is, at the very least, a perception that schools 
routinely force children to take psychotropic medications. It is also clear 
that the Child Medication and Safety Act would be an effective way to 
prevent school officials from coercing students into taking Ritalin. 
Therefore the legislation also raises legitimate legal concerns.  
A. Support of the Child Medication Safety Act 
Parents, shocked by the idea that schools can forcefully medicate their 
children, have done an admirable job of championing their cause, and have 
gained national attention in doing so.154 Not only does the CMSA appeal 
to the public’s moral sympathies, but proponents do have some legal 
grounding for their position.155 Courts have long recognized that parents 
have some degree of choice in how to educate their children,156 and in 
deciding how they wish to treat their children’s medical problems.157 This 
relatively small but vocal group of parents has cleverly capitalized on the 
larger social debate concerning overuse and abuse of Ritalin, and captured 
the public’s—and the legislature’s—attention.158 Yet in doing so, they 
have blinded Congress into ignoring long-standing legal traditions that 
firmly limit the influence parents can have in the public school system.159 
As a piece of legislation, the Child Medication Safety Act is 
appropriately broad and narrow in its focus. Although Ritalin is the most 
commonly prescribed drug, the Act includes all medications covered by 
§ 202(c) of the Controlled Substances Act.160 This insures that schools 
cannot create a loophole by recommending a “Ritalin Substitute.”161 More 
significant is the second paragraph of the bill, regarding intended 
 154. See supra note 113. 
 155. See supra notes 67–70, 88–90 and accompanying text.  
 156. See supra notes 88–90 and accompanying text.  
 157. See supra notes 77–70 and accompanying text.  
 158. See supra notes 129 and 123 and accompanying text. In 2001 the House Committee on the 
Judiciary requested an investigation and report on the issues of “Diversion and Abuse” of Ritalin in 
schools. See generally GAO, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS: ATTENTION DISORDER 
DRUGS: FEW INCIDENTS OF DIVERSION AND ABUSE IDENTIFIED BY SCHOOLS (2001).  
 159. See supra note 91–95 and accompanying text. 
 160. See supra note 134 and accompanying text; see also Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce, 
supra note 137, at 2 (“We have learned that there are some replacement drugs for Ritalin and Adderall 
that are not in Schedule II [where the chemical formulation for Ritalin is included], but are instead 
listed in other Schedules. Therefore all five schedules of the Controlled Substances Act are 
incorporated. . . .”); see also 21 U.S.C. 812(c) (2000) (The Controlled Substances Act).  
 161. Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce, supra note 137.  
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construction. It indicates that nothing in the bill prohibits school personnel 
from talking to parents about “classroom based observations.”162 This 
concept was explicitly added to the bill after members of the Committee 
on Education and the Workforce voiced concern that it was otherwise too 
restrictive.163 The amended bill recognizes that school personnel have a 
unique perspective and ability to identify symptoms of ADHD in a way 
parents may not.164 At least on paper, the CMSA evinces a legitimate 
intent to end a disturbing problem, all the while maintaining 
communication between parents and school officials.  
B. Fears of the Child Medication Safety Act 
Although their position might seem facially “anti-child” or “anti-
parent,” the opponents of the Child Medication Safety Act voice well-
founded concerns that, in actuality, promote the best interests of children. 
Even with language explicitly preserving a school’s right to communicate 
with parents, Congresswoman Susan Davis worries that the bill 
stigmatizes all public school teachers based on what is essentially the bad 
experience of a handful of families, with a small number of (likely well-
intentioned) school officials.165  
The National Association of School Psychologists (NASP) agrees with 
Congresswoman Davis’ concerns. According to their statistics, there is 
only one known case in which a school threatened expulsion if a child did 
not take Ritalin.166 NASP maintains that “parents feel they have been 
 162. H.R. 1170 at Section 2(b) 
“Nothing in subsection (a) shall be construed to create a Federal prohibition against teachers 
and other school personnel consulting or sharing classroom-based observations with parents 
or guardians regarding a student’s academic performance or behavior in the classroom or 
school, or regarding the need for evaluation for special education or related services. . . .” 
Id.  
 163. 149 CONG. REC. 4382, H4383 (daily ed. May 21, 2003) (statement of Rep. Burns) (“This is 
an important change that was brought to my attention by. . . Mr. Kennedy. . . Mrs. Davis, and. . . Ms. 
Woosley”). This was also a concern voiced by the National Association of School Psychologists. See 
supra note 147.  
 164. 149 CONG. REC. at H4383 (statement of Rep. Burns) (“[The bill] is not intended to stifle 
appropriate dialogue between parents and teachers. Teachers spend so much time with the students and 
observe a wide variety of situations and parents often ask their child’s teachers to share their 
observations . . . We certainly do not want to infringe on these important conversations. . . .”).  
 165. See supra note 141; see also 149 CONG. REC. at H4383 (Statement of Rep. Woolsey) (“I 
asked the Marin County superintendent of public schools what she thought of [the CMSA, and she 
thought] that it was a bill that would affect the many to solve the possible problem of just a few. . . .”). 
 166. Nealis Interview, supra note 11. The only reported case of actual coercion was that of the son 
of Patricia Whethers, founder of Able Child. Id. In that case, the principal of the school was 
immediately and appropriately disciplined. Id. “It was an extreme case, where the school went way out 
of bounds.” Id.  
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coerced” when, in actuality, they are being informed of their options.167 
They feel that schools are in the best position to detect possible ADHD, 
and parents have a right to as much information as possible about their 
children’s potential behavior disorders.168 Unfortunately, the publicizing of 
“sensationalized accounts” has encouraged parents to cry coercion, which 
has in turn forced schools to keep quiet.169 
The net effect is one that concerns the psychiatric community. Many 
worry that the effective “gag order” will decrease mental illness detection 
in children.170 Although CMSA supporters claim that opponents are 
puppets acting for large pharmaceutical corporations,171 it is unseemly to 
suggest that is the motivation of parties who have longstanding traditions 
of concern for children and the mentally ill.172 
Yet another criticism of the bill is that it is duplicative, and thus, 
unnecessary.173 Typically, the use of Ritalin is suggested as a component 
of an IEP.174 As explained above, IEPs carry with them mechanisms 
designed to protect both procedural175 and substantive176 due process 
 167. Id. This was the case with Sheila Matthews, the other co-founder of Able Child. When her 
son’s teachers noticed that he was having some behavioral problems in the classroom, school 
personnel gave her pamphlets about ADHD and treatment options (including Ritalin). Id. She claims 
this was coercion. Id.  
 168. Id.  
 169. Id. Practically speaking, there are several “layers of interpretation” between the intent 
effected by congress and the outcome seen in schools. Id. The severe threat of losing federal funding if 
not in compliance with the bill, combined with the tendency of parents to wrongfully accuse schools of 
coercive tactics has resulted in school policies to “err on the safe side” and “not say anything at all”—
even though the legislation specifically protects this kind of communication. Id.  
 170. Vascellaro, supra note 145 (citing Dr. Harold Koplewicz, Director of the NYU Child Study 
Center, who noted that more than eighty percent of mental health problems in children go undetected, 
and this Act would undermine the important role of teachers in attempting to detect these problems.); 
Nealis, supra note 136; APA, supra note 146 ([T]here remains “A large percentage of unidentified and 
untreated children with mental health-related needs. Enactment of this legislation would set back 
further efforts to address these children’s needs, while increasing the stigma and discrimination 
experienced by children with mental disorders.”). 
 171. Vascellaro, supra note 145.  
 172. Nealis, supra note 136.  
 173. 149 CONG. REC. at H4385 (statement of Rep. Davis) (“The parent has clear due process 
rights to seek an evaluation [and if dissatisfied still,] an appeal to a due process hearing officer is 
available.”). 
 174. See, e.g., Valerie J. v. Derry Coop. Sch. Dist. 771 F. Supp. 483 (D.N.H. 1991). The use of 
Ritalin was an IEP component that had been suggested by teachers and echoed by medical 
professionals upon evaluation of Casey. Id.  
 175. T.B. v. Warwick Sch. Dept., No. CIV.A.01-122T, 2003 WL 22069432, at *9 (D.R.I., June 6, 
2003) (“[P]rocedural violations are grounds for rejecting an IEP only if there is ‘some rational basis to 
believe that [the] procedural inadequacies compromised the pupil’s right to an appropriate education, 
seriously hampered the parent’s opportunity to participate in the formulation process, or caused a 
deprivation of educational benefits.’”).  
 176. See supra notes 52 and 97 and accompanying text.  
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rights. Furthermore, parents have a limited right to challenge a school’s 
chosen teaching strategies and methodologies because of the recognized 
presumptions that schools, as educational experts, have unique insight that 
allows them to make appropriate determinations.177 
C. IDEA 2004: 20 U.S.C. § 1412(25) 
The 2004 reauthorization of IDEA contains a provision developed from 
the ideology of the CMSA. Though the gist of the legislation is the same 
in that it explicitly prohibits school personnel from requiring students take 
Ritalin, several of the procedural aspects have been altered. Most notably, 
the requirement that states adopt policies and procedures consistent with 
the legislation as a requirement of receiving federal funding has been 
dropped.178 The intended effect of this omission, similar to the “Rules of 
Construction” language adopted in §1412(25) of IDEA 2004, is to keep 
lines of communication between parents and schools open without the fear 
of severe punishment if parents misperceive such a conversation.179  
IV. PROPOSAL 
The essential problem is that teachers and school psychologists have 
become the target of parental frustration with a system lacking the 
resources necessary to give children opportunities to maximize their 
protected right to an educational benefit. It is socially injurious to use 
legislation such as the CMSA180 to label teachers as uncaring181 for simply 
trying to maximize their ability to educate masses of children in an 
appallingly under-funded public education system.182 
Buried in the seemingly innocent language of the CMSA is a weapon 
with the power to effectively undermine the entire rubric of procedural and 
substantive due process established in IDEA. IDEA has always given 
 177. See supra notes 92–102 and accompanying text.  
 178. See supra note 153.  
 179. Nealis Interview, supra note 11.  
 180. For the remainder of this Note, the term “CMSA” will refer to the enacted version codified in 
IDEA 2004 as §1412(25).  
 181. See supra note 141.  
 182. National Education Association Special Education and the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act, http://www.nea.org/specialed (last visited Feb. 6, 2006). Currently, the average per 
student expenditure for public schools is roughly $7500. The average cost of education for a special 
education student is almost $17,000. Id. Yet in 2004 the federal government provided public schools 
with just twenty percent of the necessary additional funding (after promising to pay forty percent in 
IDEA). Id. This has created a $10.6 billion dollar “shortfall” requiring local school districts to pick up 
the slack. Id.  
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parents the right to challenge proposed IEPs in a neutral administrative 
hearing.183 Circumventing this fundamental IDEA procedure undermines 
the use of the administrative hearing procedure for parents challenging 
IEPs outside of the ADHD context.184 More significantly, it provides 
special treatment that is unavailable to families of children with other 
disabilities, by categorically declaring that parents’ preferences will be 
honored. CMSA proponents argue that, because Ritalin is a chemical 
treatment, the appropriate legal analysis is wholly dissimilar from cases 
regarding education methodology disputes. This is an inaccurate 
representation of the conflict. It is undeniable that psychotropic 
medications are a simple and effective treatment option.185 These children 
should not be denied this therapy simply because their parents do not 
recognize that it is a legitimate option, or are fearful of the stigma 
attached.186  
Although the Child Medication Safety Act attempts to remedy this 
problem by specifically preserving a school’s role in expressing concern 
for students, in reality it does nothing more than lend legitimacy to a 
sensationalized crisis.187 In doing so, it neglects the reality that there are 
only a handful of cases nationwide in which coercion is a reality.188 It 
further ignores the fact that the behavior exhibited by schools in those 
extreme cases is already condemned.189 The enacted CMSA is superfluous 
legislation that explicitly reiterates procedures and restrictions firmly 
entrenched in IDEA. Its only effect is to exacerbate the infrequent problem 
of coerced medication while perpetuating the notion that schools are 
routinely forcing Ritalin on children, all the while stigmatizing a 
legitimate mental health concern and an effective course of treatment.  
The advent of legislative proposals to “ban mandatory mental health 
screening”190—a process that as of now does not exist in schools—
 183. See supra notes 51–53 and accompanying text.  
 184. See, e.g., Hendrick Hudson Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982); Burilovich v. Bd. 
of Educ. of the Lincoln Consolidated Sch., 208 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2000); Cone v. Randolph County 
Sch., 302 F. Supp. 2d 500 (M.D.N.C. 2004); T.B. v. Warwick Sch. Dep’t 2003 WL 22069432 (D.R.I. 
June 6, 2003). 
 185. See supra note 22; Valerie J. v. Derry Coop. School Dist., 771 F. Supp. 483 (D.N.H. 1991) 
(Parents wanted child to remain in a special education classroom, while school expressed a preference 
for mainstreaming with use of Ritalin.). This demonstrates that the fundamental classification of 
Ritalin use as a “teaching method” because the alternatives considered are clearly options that would 
be classified as such.  
 186. Nealis Interview, supra note 11. 
 187. Id.  
 188. Id.  
 189. Id.  
 190. H.R. 181 109th Cong. § 3 (2005), supra note 153.  
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demonstrates the power of the parents’ rights movement and its continuing 
crusade to prevent schools from performing their important function in 
detecting mental health issues in children, and working to educate them in 
the best way possible. As such, it is imperative that the message of the 
parent’s rights movement be tempered by a close inspection of the law, 
which clearly limits parental rights to make decisions that may not be in 
the best interest of their children.  
V. CONCLUSION 
From a legal perspective, legislation such as the Child Medication 
Safety Act exploits the notion that parents have the right to raise and 
educate their children as they choose. The CMSA ignores longstanding 
legal doctrine that explicitly limits this right, and allows the state to 
exercise its police powers to ensure the well-being of its children.191 
Although the most problematic elements of the Child Medication Safety 
Act were left out of IDEA 2004,192 similar issues are now being raised in 
the context of anti-mandatory mental health screening legislation.193 Such 
legislation undermines the complex and delicate balance of power between 
parents and educators that is contemplated under IDEA’s longstanding 
framework,194 wipes out its notions of procedural and substantive due 
process,195 unfairly characterizes teachers as uncaring,196 and stigmatizes 
mental illness.197 Such legislation is therefore harmful to America’s school 
children, and must be carefully scrutinized for consistency with recognized 
legal doctrine, rather than hastily passed as a result of a sensationalized 
crisis. 
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 191. See supra notes 65–71 and accompanying text.  
 192. See supra notes 130, 151. When comparing §1412(25) to the original proposed CMAS, there 
are two clear changes that stand out: (1), the inclusion of the “rules of construction” which purports to 
protect communication between parents and educators, and (2), the exclusion of the provision 
mandating states adapt policies and procedures consistent with the legislation as a condition of 
receiving federal funding. Without these two of its sharpest teeth, the CMSA is relatively benign.  
 193. See supra note 153.  
 194. See supra notes 143 and 184 and accompanying text.  
 195. See supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text.  
 196. See supra notes 141, 181 and accompanying text.  
 197. See supra notes 186 and accompanying text.  
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